Abstract Avoiding dangerous climate change will require a rapid transition away from fossil fuels. By some estimates, global consumption and production of fossil fuels-particularly coal and oil-will need to end almost entirely within 50 years. Given the scale of such a transition, nations may need to consider policies that constrain growth in fossil fuel supplies in addition to those that reduce demand. Here, we examine the emissions implications of a supplyconstraining measure that was rapidly gaining momentum in the United States (US) under the Obama administration: ceasing the issuance of new leases for fossil fuel extraction on federal lands and waters. Such a measure could reduce global carbon dioxide emissions by an estimated 280 million tons annually by 2030, comparable to that of other major climate policies adopted or considered by the Obama administration. Our findings suggest that measures to constrain fossil fuel supply-though not currently viable in a US Trump administration-deserve further consideration at subnational levels in the US or by other countries now, and by future US administrations.
Introduction
Avoiding dangerous climate change will require a rapid transition away from fossil fuels. By some estimates, global consumption of these fuels-particularly coal and oil-will need to end almost entirely within 50 years (Rogelj et al. 2015) . The technical and policy challenges of transitioning power, transport, buildings, and industrial systems to low-carbon fuels have been-and continue to be-studied in extraordinarily detail, in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports, and in the academic and grey literature (IEA 2017; IPCC 2014; Rockström et al. 2017) . These studies have enabled broader understanding and support of policies and measures to limit fossil fuel-based CO 2 emissions from energy consumption, even if not yet to the level needed to meet the goals agreed in the Paris Agreement (UNEP 2017).
Policies that aim to mitigate climate change by constraining fossil fuel exploration and production have received far less attention, despite widely understood findings that most of the world's fossil fuel reserves would need to remain undeveloped to meet stringent climate goals (McGlade and Ekins 2015) . It is important to understand whether and how such policies could help further reduce global CO 2 emissions, complementing and extending the many efforts already underway to reduce fossil fuel consumption. This article seeks to enhance this understanding, by examining the specific case of US policy on leasing federal lands for fossil fuel production.
The motivation for considering supply-side policies is not merely theoretical. Some nations have proposed-and adopted-policies that would limit future fossil fuel production. These include temporary moratoria on new coal-mining activities in China, the United States, and Indonesia, three of the world's top five coal producers (Piggot et al. 2017) , as well as moratoria on oil exploration in Costa Rica and France (Geiling 2017) . In this article, we explore the case of the United States (US), the world's largest fossil fuel producer. Though the current US Trump administration is seeking expansion of the country's fossil fuel industry, the Obama administration made unprecedented and unique policy proposals to constrain fossil fuel production in the interests of global climate change objectives.
As a case study for the potential effect of constraining fossil fuel production on CO 2 emissions, we examine here a specific policy proposal introduced in both houses of Congress in 2015 and . This legislation would have ended, over time, the production of coal, oil, and natural gas from lands and waters owned by the U.S. federal government, through a cessation of issuance of the leases required to begin fossil fuel exploration and production activities from these areas (Huffman et al. 2016; Merkley et al. 2015) .
The central effect we evaluate is the net impact of ceasing new leases on global CO 2 emissions, by using economic tools to consider the market effects and the substitution by other sources of fossil and other fuels. This lens-the net, or incremental-CO 2 effect allows us to consider the leasing policy alongside other major policy proposals of President Obama's climate action plan, as well as to directly address the question of the leakage effects of supply-side policies, i.e., how production elsewhere may increase in response to a local decrease, partially negating the CO 2 emission-reduction benefits. This incremental lens also allows our work to build on analyses of what fossil fuels would need to be left undeveloped globally to stay within climate limits (McGlade and Ekins 2015; Muttitt et al. 2016) . Though useful at a global level, these analyses do not provide insights into specific policies and their incremental effects, which are often of great interest to decision makers. Throughout, we focus on the year 2030, as it represents the focus year of current international climate negotiations.
We note that there remain substantial political challenges to constraining fossil fuel supply. Many national governments gain substantial revenue from fossil fuel extraction, leading to a Bcarbon entanglement^of entrenched interests that Bwill not easily be undone^ (Gurría 2013) . Still, as we show here, policies that constrain fossil fuels-though imperfect-can have emissions benefits, and also bring other advantages.
Method
Our approach for assessing the net CO 2 impact of the lease restriction policy follows the contours of most GHG abatement analyses, in that we first articulate a reference case of an energy system, then define a policy intervention that would affect that system, and finally quantify the change in CO 2 emissions that would result (Sathaye and Meyers 1995) . Specifically, we (1) estimate the future reference case for US coal, oil, and gas production, including detail on production from federal and non-federal lands and waters; (2) estimate what quantities of federal production would be affected by a lease restriction policy; and (3) model the market response to cutting this production as a supply shock for the year 2030, using economic tools.
For step 1, we use the reference scenario of the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) as the primary reference case for coal, oil, and gas production (US EIA 2015a). The EIA is the federal agency responsible for creating scenarios of US energy production and consumption. This reference scenario does not include adoption of the Clean Power Plan, which if implemented would reshape power markets in the US by requiring states to meet certain emissions performance standards. The Clean Power Plan has been under challenge in the courts, and President Trump has pledged to withdraw it. Still, because the Plan has been passed as law, we also consider an alternate case where it is implemented.
Starting from these EIA scenarios, we use data from the US Department of Interior (ONRR 2015), which oversees production from federal lands, to estimate what fraction of US fossil fuels will be extracted from federal vs. non-federal land. We assume that the share of federal (vs. non-federal) production remains constant at recent (2014) levels for each fuel in each region (e.g., for coal from Wyoming or oil from the Gulf Coast) (ONRR 2015; US EIA 2015b).
For step 2, we identify the expected fossil fuel production from federal leases that have not yet been issued, and therefore would be affected by the lease restriction policy. For oil and gas, we use an extensive database of US oil and gas fields (Rystad Energy 2016) that (among other attributes) describes where each field is in its life cycle, from being leased to each phase of production. For coal, for which commercial databases are not as available, we draw on an industry report (Miller and Bate 2011 ) that estimated year-end 2010 reserves of 5.8 billion short tons in the Powder River Basin and a government report that estimated year-end 2012 reserves of 0.9 billion short tons elsewhere (US GAO 2013). We update these sources to 2015 based on subsequent actual annual production (ONRR 2015) or new lease inflow (Headwaters Economics 2015) , and assume that producers will continue to seek new leases in the future at rates that maintain reserves equivalent to 15 years of expected production, an industry common practice observed in recent years and consistent with ranges reported by the US Geological Survey (Pierce and Dennen 2009) and coal industry consultants (Miller and Bate 2011) . We assume that producers extract the same fraction of these new stocks each year as they do of existing stocks. Lastly, when it comes to quantifying the supply shock (step 3), we assume that the hundreds of relatively small plots of state land in Wyoming that are entirely contained within federal parcels would phase down along with federal coal, adding about 10% to the amount of federal coal left undeveloped (Luppens and Scott 2015) .
The end result of steps 1 and 2 is displayed in Supplementary Fig. 1 for each fuel individually and indicates that coal is the fuel most strongly contained within federal lands.
For step 3, in principle, a single, comprehensive model of global fuel markets could be used to assess how, in combination, cuts in US coal, oil, and gas production that result from lease restrictions would affect both domestic (US) and international markets. Such models have at times been used to assess the global CO 2 implications of domestic fuel supply changes in other contexts (Anderson and McKibbin 2000; Haftendorn et al. 2012) . However, there are several features of the US fuel market that are not, to our knowledge, captured adequately in any single model. Most notably, US power supply is especially complicated and could still be subject to a rule, the Clean Power Plan, that would impose unique emissions performance standards on each of the 50 states in the US. Few models are capable of modeling this complexity, let alone how changes in regional fuel supplies could affect the power market dynamics or how changes in the domestic market may play out internationally. For this reason, we model coal and gas markets (which are strongly domestic) separately from oil markets (which are strongly global), using the best approach we could identify for each market, and with discussions of the limitations and uncertainties of each approach.
Modeling the oil market
First, for oil, which is a global market with relatively little interaction with coal and gas markets, we model it on its own, much like other analysts have done (Bordoff and Houser 2015; Wolvovsky and Anderson 2016) . Here, we first apply a simple microeconomic model that estimates changes in oil consumption as a function of the change in production in integrated global oil market, following a common elasticity-based approach (Erickson and Lazarus 2014; Perloff 2007) . Elasticities relate the percent change in demand or supply of a good to the percent change in its price. We use a long-run elasticity of world crude oil demand of − 0.2 based on a literature review (Hamilton 2009), and within the range, from − 0.072 to − 0.3, found by a more recent review (Bordoff and Houser 2015) . We derive elasticities of supply from Rystad Energy's oil supply curve for the year 2030 (Rystad Energy 2016), at three different prices, reflecting alternate storylines about how the oil market could evolve, in light of significant underlying uncertainties. In our main case, tuned to the same EIA reference case used for oil production forecasts (as described above), the oil price is about US$ 110 per barrel in 2030 ( Table 1 ). At that level, Rystad Energy estimates that the oil market is not very price sensitive (low elasticity); the supply curve is Bsteep,^and there is relatively little new oil available at that price level that would not also be produced at much lower prices.
The ratios presented for the reference case are similar to those for others published in the literature. In particular, several studies find this ratio to be about 0.5, an outcome that would occur whenever supply and demand elasticities are equal in magnitude, since in that case, a supply shock would be accommodated by equal and opposite changes to production and consumption (Faehn et al. 2017; Metcalf 2016; Wolvovsky and Anderson 2016) . By contrast, if consumers were more price sensitive than suppliers, i.e., the demand curve was flatter (elasticity more negative), then the ratio would exceed 0.5 (Faehn et al. 2017) . Or, if suppliers were instead less price sensitive than consumers (flatter supply curve), the ratio would be less than 0.5, as in the two other cases displayed in Table 1 . These cases reflect two alternative storylines for the oil market and oil prices: a Bplentiful supply^reference case that leads to a 2030 oil price of US$ 70/bbl and a Breduced demand^case that is consistent with the Paris Agreement goal of limiting warming Bwell below 2 degrees^that results in a 2030 oil price of US$ 60/bbl. The plentiful supply case supposes that the costs of new oil developments have declined (this type of market could also emerge if momentum towards electric vehicles-and away from combustion vehicles-accelerates, reducing demand relative to supply) (Rystad Energy 2017). The reduced demand case is drawn from three recent studies (Copenhagen Economics 2017; IEA 2017; Jaccard et al. 2018) . It is important to note that the analytical approach for oil, and in the next section for coal, does not reflect the potential for inter-temporal dynamics that Sinn (2012) has termed the Bgreen paradox,^wherein producers rapidly draw down their reserves in anticipation of broader or more ambitious climate policy efforts on the horizon.
In addition to this simple, elasticity-based approach to assess change in own-fuel oil consumption, we also incorporate explicit consideration of oil substitutes, since the effects of changing US federal leasing policy would play out over decades, during which alternative fuels could become more widely available and cost-competitive. These developments regarding substitutes do not lend themselves well to an elasticity-based approach, however, given how existing research on the long-term elasticities of substitution between oil and other transport fuels is too limited (Faehn et al. 2017) , and because future availability of substitutes may be more determined by policy choices (yet to be made) than by microeconomics. Instead, to characterize oil substitutes, we look to the findings of global scenario analyses by the IEA.
IEA scenarios suggest that price-induced drops in oil consumption would result in reduced overall energy use and switching to substitute fuels in roughly equal proportions (IEA 2015) . Therefore, for each unit drop in oil use (in energy terms), we assume, similarly, that half will lead to lower energy consumption and half will lead to greater use of substitute fuels. Also drawing from IEA scenario results, we assume that the alternative fuel mix is 85% as greenhouse gas (GHG)-intensive as oil-based fuels, based on a mix of biofuels (substantial GHG benefit), compressed natural gas (little if any GHG benefit, due to methane leakage during refueling), and electricity (little if any GHG benefit in the areas where oil use is increasing the fastest, due to high average CO 2 -intensity of new power plants).
Modeling the coal market
For coal, the situation, as noted above, is more complex. In particular, the unique characteristics of the aging US coal power fleet constrain fuel substitution more than simple microeconomics might suggest (Haggerty et al. 2015; Joskow 1987) . Many US power plants were designed to use coal with the relatively unique low-sulfur, sub-bituminous characteristics of Powder River Basin coal, which accounts for 80% of the coal produced on federal lands. Switching to other coals can require major, costly retrofits (e.g., to coal processing or pollution controls, or a complete rebuild of the boiler). Accordingly, to assess the impacts of reduced federal coal availability, we rely on runs of the Integrated Planning Model (IPM), which represents each US power plant and coal resource. We use the same runs of the IPM model (Vulcan/ICF 2016) as did a recent analysis by White House Council of Economic advisors (CEA 2016) . Throughout, we exclude metallurgical coal (since it has few low-carbon substitutes).
The coal export market is not described in detail in IPM documentation or in Vulcan/ICF (2016) . Therefore, for exports, we instead apply a simple model of supply and demand using a price elasticity of demand of − 1.16 drawn from China (Jiao et al. 2009 ), a price elasticity of supply of 2.6 for the Pacific Basin (Aldina 2013) , and an elasticity of substitution of 1.4 (Stern 2012).
For gas, we do not model the market and net emissions effects of reductions in US supply that would result from restricted federal leasing. This is because numerous other analyses of gas markets have concluded that, at least in the next couple decades, the net CO 2 effect of expanding or contracting gas supply is neither strongly positive nor strongly negative. This is because gas can both displace coal (a CO 2 decrease) and displace renewables or increase consumption (a CO 2 increase), leading to countervailing effects. Modeling reviews have emphasized that these effects roughly balance each other (Energy Modeling Forum 2013; Lazarus et al. 2015) , and so we do not consider it further here relative to the effects of the more carbon-intensive fuels coal and oil. This approach is conservative, as further limits in gas supply could enhance the CO 2 emission reductions benefits of a coal restriction policy, to the extent that any resulting increase in gas prices caused more of the lost coal power to be shifted to low-carbon sources instead of to gas.
Estimating the CO 2 emissions effects
To estimate the CO 2 emissions effects from the change in coal, gas, or oil consumption, we apply simple carbon contents from the national greenhouse gas inventory of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (US EPA 2014). We discount the CO 2 emissions that would result from savings in oil by 8%, to account for the oil left in products (e.g., plastics) that are not combusted (Heede 2013 ).
Results and discussion
For each fuel, we report results in two ways. First, we report net change in fuel consumption as a function of the quantity of fuel affected by the lease restriction policy. These results therefore isolate the market effect of the policy in energy terms, expressed per unit (EJ) of coal or oil left undeveloped. Second, we apply these results to the estimated absolute change in federal production (EJ of coal or oil left undeveloped) to estimate overall changes in energy consumption and, from there, CO 2 emissions.
Results for oil
For oil, assuming the reference case oil market (Table 1 ) and elasticity of demand of − 0.2, our oil market model indicates that for each EJ of federal US oil production cut in 2030 from a businessas-usual reference case, other oil supplies would substitute for 0.39 EJ, as the increased prices (about 2%) would cause other suppliers in the US and (especially) globally to increase production. Net oil consumption would drop by 0.61 EJ for each EJ of oil left undeveloped. (Table 1 provides other values for this parameter based on alternate views of the world oil market.)
Based on these results, we estimate that ceasing new leasing (and not renewing existing, non-producing leases), the US Department of Interior would avoid the production of about 1.7 EJ (820,000 barrels per day) of oil in 2030, the equivalent of 110 Mt CO 2 (Fig. 1a) . This reduction in production and associated emissions would be offset by increased supply of other, substitute oil resources (44 Mt CO 2 ) and other non-petroleum fuels (29 Mt CO 2 ) for a net decrease of 39 Mt CO 2 . (Supplementary Table 1 shows results for the other oil market cases described in Table 1 Fig. 1 Impacts of decreased oil and coal production on fuel markets in 2030, for oil (a) and coal (b). Individual effects may not add to total due to rounding
Results for coal
For coal, results from IPM indicate that, absent the Clean Power Plan, each EJ of coal no longer supplied (due to lease restrictions) to domestic power markets in 2030 would lead to substitution of 0.31 EJ from other coal supplies, especially from the Illinois Basin and Northern Appalachia. The net drop in national coal consumption would be 0.69 EJ for each EJ of federal coal not produced because of the lease restrictions. Gas consumption would also increase 0.35 EJ, to make up for the lost coal-based electricity.
For coal export markets, we find that each EJ of US coal no longer exported to Asian power markets (e.g., South Korea and the Philippines) would yield a drop in net coal consumption of 0.30 EJ, accounting for partial substitution by other, higher cost sources of coal (e.g., from Indonesia and Australia). This ratio is within the range of results of global steam coal market modeling analysis, which found that each unit of coal not supplied to the Pacific coal market would lead to a reduction in coal consumption of between 0.1 and 0.4 units, depending on whether the supply market was less constrained (lower result) or more constrained (higher result) (Haftendorn et al. 2012) .
The higher price of coal would also lead to some switching to natural gas in Asian power markets (less so than in the US, given that gas is more costly and less available in Asia), amounting to an increase in natural gas consumption of 0.07 EJ for every EJ of US coal no longer exported due to the lease restrictions.
In total, for coal, we find that leasing restrictions would reduce production by 5.4 EJ in 2030. The drop in CO 2 emissions from the consumption of federal coal (largely from the Powder River Basin) in that year would be about 490 Mt CO 2 , as shown in Fig. 1b . Increased coal and gas supplies from other sources would add back 162 Mt CO 2 and 90 Mt CO 2 , respectively, resulting in a net overall reduction in emissions of 240 Mt CO 2 .
Under some circumstances, lease restrictions on coal might have considerably less impact on CO 2 emissions. The first is if large new coal mines were to be developed on state, tribal, or private lands in the Powder River Basin that could substitute for some of the lost federal coal. For example, were proposals (currently on hold) to develop the Otter Creek mine on state land in Montana and the Big Metal Mine on Crow Reservation lands to proceed, they could potentially make up for reduced federal coal production more easily than could other alternative supplies, i.e., the higher-sulfur coals from the Illinois Basin or Appalachia. In such a case, since substitution of non-federal coal would be higher, net CO 2 impacts would be lower.
The CO 2 emissions impact could also be substantially lower if the Clean Power Plan was implemented, since the Plan's state-by-state emissions performance standards could be expected to drive down emissions from coal-fired power. In such a case, we estimate that the net emissions impact of the coal leasing restrictions beyond the Clean Power Plan would be 71 Mt CO 2 (Supplementary Fig. 2 ). Though the details of are far from certain, it is also possible that the Clean Power Plan could be Bbinding^for all states, nearly fully determining power sector CO 2 emissions. In that outcome, further increases in the cost of coal would decrease the cost of complying with the Clean Power Plan (decreasing the credit or allowance prices in the Plan's trading systems), but would offer little opportunity for further price-driven emission reductions (Gerarden et al. 2016 ).
Comparison of emissions abatement to other policies
Combining our oil and coal results, we find that ceasing to issue new and renewed leases for fossil fuel extraction from federal lands and waters could reduce net global CO 2 emissions by about 280 Mt per year by 2030 without the Clean Power Plan in place, or 110 Mt CO 2 with it (Supplementary Table 2 ).
This level of emission reduction is as big or greater than other key policies that featured prominently in the Obama administration's efforts, such as the EPA's proposed standards for light-and medium-/heavy-duty vehicles, which were expected to yield 200 and 70 Mt in CO 2 savings, respectively, in 2030 (US EPA 2012; US EPA 2015a). By contrast, the EPA expected the Clean Power Plan to yield emission benefits that were considerably larger: 410 Mt CO 2 in 2030 (US EPA 2015b).
Still, the finding that the lease restriction policy would have reduced emissions by 110 to 280 Mt CO 2 in 2030, depending on assumptions about Clean Power Plan implementation, is notable. This is because US government analyses of the potential GHG emissions effects of policies that affect fossil fuel supply have often assumed that leakage, in the form of increased fossil fuel production from other sources, would cancel most, if not all, of the GHG emissions benefit (Burger and Wentz 2017) .
Furthermore, the broader, long-term implications of the leasing restrictions could be more profound than the results for 2030 alone might suggest. New leases begin to account for a majority of federal fossil fuel production only after 2030 (Supplementary Table 1 ), as production from existing leases plays out. Furthermore, if other countries also constrained fossil fuel production, supply curves would steepen, elasticities of supply would decrease, and the effects of the lease restriction policy would be amplified. By contrast, if other countries rapidly expanded fossil fuel supplies, the supply curve would Bflatten^(increasing elasticity), decreasing the policy's CO 2 emissions benefit.
Cost-effectiveness as an additional criterion for assessing effectiveness
The findings above demonstrate that the lease restriction policy is comparable in global GHG emission reductions to other policies planned by the US Obama Administration. Climate policy design generally also includes other considerations, especially cost-effectiveness and political feasibility. For example, the EPA had estimated that the cost-effectiveness of the light-duty and heavy-duty vehicle standards discussed above would have been US$ − 189/t CO 2 and US$ − 210/t CO 2 for cars and heavy-duty trucks, respectively, while EPA estimated the compliance costs of the Clean Power Plan at US$ 16/t CO 2 and US$ 27/t CO2 in 2030, depending on the compliance approach followed (US EPA 2012; US EPA 2015a; US EPA 2015b).
Cost-effectiveness can also be roughly estimated for the lease-reduction policy, by counting costs as the rents that fossil fuel developers would forgo (Table 2 ). This approach to estimating costs is consistent with prior studies of the costs of fossil fuel reserves left undeveloped as a result of climate policy (Bauer et al. 2013; Faehn et al. 2017) .
By this approach, limiting new federal coal leases appears to have an abatement cost of about US$ 20/t CO 2 , well within the range of costs associated with other options for reducing US greenhouse gas emissions deemed cost-effective in achieving emission-reduction goals. For example, the cost of such measures in McKinsey and Company (2007) and Paltsev et al. (2009) ranges from US$ (90) to US$ 100/t CO 2 .
By contrast, the 2030 abatement cost of reducing CO 2 emissions through limits on oil extraction-e.g., US$ 430/t CO 2 for the large Gulf of Mexico fields-is several times higher than this range. Production from such fields would be highly profitable at the US$ 110/bbl oil price that EIA (2015a) projected for 2030, given a breakeven price half that level. For highercost, later-stage fields, e.g., in California's San Joaquin basin, where breakeven prices can exceed US$ 75 per barrel, restricting leases could reduce global CO 2 emissions at a cost of about US$ 250 per t CO 2 , again assuming oil priced at US$ 110/bbl. Some of those later-stage basins may also have higher GHG profiles (Masnadi and Brandt 2017) , which would increase the GHG abatement beyond what we quantify here, and decrease costs.
These findings suggest that, at least relative to business-as-usual oil prices, limits on federal oil production are less cost-effective than most emission-reducing measures typically considered. However, if oil markets were to evolve in the alternate scenarios envisioned where prices were instead US$ 60 or US$ 70 per barrel (Table 1) , the cost of the lease restrictions would decrease, since the forgone rents would be less. For example, in an oil market of US$ 60 per barrel, roughly, the level consistent with the Paris Agreement's 2-degree warming threshold, the abatement cost of restricting federal offshore leases in the Gulf of Mexico would drop to about US$ 120/t CO 2 (Supplementary Table 3 ). At these oil prices, some resources (e.g., oil in California's San Joaquin valley) may not be economic at all. In such a case, the lease restriction policy might have no effect on oil production or CO 2 emissions, assuming that investors correctly anticipate future oil prices and thereby avoid non-economic investments. However, investors may underestimate global action to achieve Paris goals, as well as other factors (e.g., development of electric vehicles) that might depress future oil prices. If this is the case, then, the lease restriction policy could help reduce the risk of oil investments becoming stranded assets (IEA 2016) , as well as the risk of locking-in higher oil production levels than would have resulted if investors had better foresight.
Furthermore, jurisdictions may pursue certain higher cost (higher US$/t CO 2 ) measures for other reasons, such as political feasibility or demonstrating leadership. This is particularly the case for oil and transportation, where abatement costs are generally much higher than those for coal or the electric sector. For example, California's proposed strategy for meeting their 2030 GHG emissions target calls for a package of measures to help transition away from oil use in transportation with costs approaching US$ 300/t CO 2 (CARB 2017). There are also other considerations that may affect the willingness of policymakers to adopt limits on oil extraction on climate grounds. One is how GHG emissions accounting is normally performed, since the CO 2 emissions savings from limiting oil production would play out in global (not purely domestic) oil markets, and therefore would not be fully reflected in the territory's own GHG emissions account, at least not using standard, IPCC-based territorial GHG emissions accounting (IPCC 2006) . As a result, supplemental GHG emissions accounting may be needed for territories to gain recognition for adopting supply-side climate policies (Davis et al. 2011 , Piggot et al. 2017 , Steininger and Schinko 2016 .
Conclusions
The US government exercises substantial control over the federal lands and water that account for a quarter of US fossil fuel production. Under the Obama Administration, the Department of Interior indicated its intent to consider the climate implications of its fossil fuel leasing by evaluating, as a criterion for leasing, Bwhether the leasing and production of large quantities of coal… is consistent the Nation's goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions^ (BLM 2016, p. 3) as well as a Bno new leasing alternative…as a means to reduce greenhouse gas emissions ( BLM 2017, p. 6-19) .
Our findings here indicate that restricting future lease issuance and renewal could lead to reductions in federal fossil fuel production of about 37% in 2030. This restriction would lead to slightly higher fossil fuel prices, stimulating added production from other sources, resulting in a lesser overall net effect on global fossil fuel use and CO 2 emissions. (Market-induced emissions leakage is not unique to action on the supply side: it also occurs for demand-side policies, though often smaller in magnitude.) Considering these effects, we estimate that the lease restriction policy would reduce global CO 2 emissions by 280 Mt in 2030, an amount on par with, and in many cases greater than, that of other major policies in President Obama's climate action plan.
Our findings suggest that policies to constrain fossil fuel supply deserve more consideration in climate policy discourse. These policies could be enacted as restrictions on extraction, as examined here, or through pricing mechanisms, such as increased royalties or production taxes. For example, the Obama Administration's White House Council of Economic Advisors analyzed the impacts of imposing a substantially higher royalty rate on federal coal extraction, with similar incremental CO 2 emissions effects as we find here (CEA, 2016) . A royalty adder has the benefit that it would generate revenue to support affected communities in a transition from fossil fuel extraction to other sources of livelihood (Gillingham and Stock 2016) .
The analytical tools used here can also help inform the environmental review of projects that would affect future fossil fuel supply. Many environmental review processes have assumed perfect substitution, i.e., that each ton of coal or barrel of oil delivered to the market by a new project would simply offset, one-for-one, a ton or barrel produced elsewhere, with no net effect on greenhouse gas emissions (Burger and Wentz 2017) . As a US appeals judge wrote, however, this assumption of perfect substitution assumption is Birrational,^in that it contradicts basic supply and demand principles (Briscoe 2017). Further, as our analysis shows, the assumption of perfect substitution is also unnecessary, as methods exist to provide estimates of net production and CO 2 impacts. Indeed, our analysis developed no new methods; it simply used existing tools to look at the question of substitution for multiple fuels for a particular policy context.
More broadly, our findings suggest that major fossil fuel-producing nations intent on achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement (or subnational territories within them, especially the US) should consider applying methods such as those presented here to reevaluating their policies and plans for fossil fuel development, in light of their impact on global CO 2 emissions.
